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This research adopted an interdependence analysis of sacrifice, examining the link between commit-
ment (i.e., the subjective experience of dependence and long-term orientation) and willingness to
sacrifice in ongoing close relationships, and determining whether this link is moderated by preexisting
individual differences in social value orientation (i.e., prosocial, individualistic, or competitive orien-
tation). Consistent with hypotheses, results of 2 studies revealed both that willingness to sacrifice
was associated with greater commitment and that this link was more pronounced among individualists
than among prosocials. Results also revealed an association between one's own willingness to
sacrifice and beliefs regarding the partner's willingness to sacrifice (this link was somewhat more
pronounced among prosocials than among individualists) and one's own willingness to sacrifice and
actual partner's willingness to sacrifice.
Individuals involved in close relationships sometimes find il
necessary, important, and to some degree desirable to forego
immediate personal well-being and engage in some form of
self-sacrifice (e.g., spending less time with one's own friends;
moving to a somewhat undesirable city for the sake of a partner's
career). What makes individuals willing to forego immediate
self-interest and engage in self-sacrificial activities? To what
extent can willingness to sacrifice be understood in terms of
considerations of long-term personal well-being or concern with
the partner's well-being? And to what extent can such basic
motivational processes be understood in terms of relatively sta-
ble personality differences?
During the past several decades, such questions have been
addressed in the context of game theory, a literature focusing on
how individuals solve different conflicts of interest (cf. Luce &
Raiffa, 1957; Von Neuman & Morgenstern, 1947; for reviews,
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see Komorita & Parks, 1994; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). This body
of research has focused on experimentally induced patterns of
interdependence between individuals who typically do not have
a shared history of interdependence or an extended future of
interdependence (i.e., experimental games). Paradoxically, moti-
vations relevant to willingness to sacrifice and prosocial behavior
arguably are relatively more important in ongoing, enduring rela-
tionships, because such partners share a history as well as a future
of interdependence. Moreover, one might assume that acts of
sacrifice are relatively frequently displayed in such relationships
(particularly in close relationships). From this perspective, it is
interesting to note that prior research on close relationships has
devoted little attention to prosocial motivation per se; rather, the
literature on close relationships has tended to focus on issues
such as attraction, intimacy, and relationship functioning (for
reviews, see Berscheid, 1994; Clark & Reis, 1988).
The present research adopts an interdependence analysis of
willingness to sacrifice in close relationships, seeking to inte-
grate empirically distinct literatures regarding interpersonal ori-
entations, prosocial behavior, and close relationships. Using
constructs and principles of interdependence theory (Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978), we propose that the motivations relevant lo
understanding willingness to sacrifice are partially shaped by
(a) the degree to which an individual experiences dependence
and long-term orientation to a relationship (i.e., commitment)
and (b) preexisting interpersonal orientations, tendencies that
presumably are not developed in the context of that ongoing
relationship (cf. Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; McClintock, 1972).
The primary goal of the present research was to examine the
moderating role of individual differences in social value orienta-
tions—preferences for particular patterns of outcomes for self
in relation to others (McClintock, 1972)—in affecting the asso-
ciation between dependence-relevant features of relationships
and willingness to sacrifice.
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An Interdependence Analysis of Willingness to Sacrifice
In the context of ongoing close relationships, partners' inter-
ests do not always correspond. Across the variety of domains
that are likely to characterize ongoing close relationships, part-
ners may have differing interests, creating interdependence prob-
lems that challenge the well-being of the individual, the partner,
or the relationship (cf. Holmes & Boon, 1990; Kelley, 1979).
At least in part, such interdependence problems can be charac-
terized as social dilemmas, in that individuals are confronted
with the conflict between their own interests versus those of the
partner and their collective interests (cf. Komorita & Parks,
1994; Van Lange & Messick, 1996). That is, such situations
call for decisions about whether to sacrifice, defined as forego-
ing one's immediate self-interest to promote the well-being of
the partner or the relationship (cf. Van Lange, Rusbult, et al.,
1997).1 Given that acts of sacrifice may entail undesirable or
costly activities, it is important to distinguish between the con-
cepts of sacrifice and costs. First, sacrifice refers to behavior
(i.e., behavior that departs from direct self-interest), whereas
cost refers to the psychological experience of negative or unde-
sirable events (e.g., my partner is a bit clumsy). Second, sacri-
fice is inspired by a variety of goals (e.g., long-term personal
well-being; the well-being of the partner; reciprocity) and to
some degree is volitional, whereas costs do not typically occur
as a result of choice (cf. Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997).
According to interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut,
1978), willingness to sacrifice in ongoing relationships is likely
to be influenced by a variety of factors, including the broader
features of interdependence underlying a relationship, personally
held goals or social dispositions, as well as beliefs regarding a
partner's willingness to sacrifice (cf. Kelley, 1979; McClin-
tock & Liebrand, 19S8). Such prosocial behavior is asserted to
result from a transformation of the objective interdependence
situation, a situation that describes the direct outcomes each
partner would obtain for the joint activities resulting from vari-
ous combinations of their own and their partner's behavioral
choices (i.e., the given matrix). The product of transformation
of motivation is a reconceptualized situation (i.e., the effective
matrix) that delineates preferences that are more strongly linked
to behavior in settings of interdependence. Thus, transformation
of motivation refers to a habitual or thoughtful process that may
lead the individual to forego immediate self-interest and to act
on the basis of broader goals (i.e., to act in accordance with
the effective matrix). Such broader goals may include desire to
enhance the long-term well-being of oneself, the relationship,
the partner, or the desire to seek reciprocity.
Relationship-Based Transformations:
The Role of Commitment
According to interdependence theory, prosocial behavior in
ongoing relationships is strongly shaped by the broader interde-
pendence structure underlying a relationship (Kelley & Thibaut,
1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). One primary feature of
interdependence is level of dependence upon a relationship,
which is asserted to be influenced by the level of satisfaction
individuals derive from their relationships (i.e., the degree to
which the relationship is an important source of happiness, love,
and fulfilment of desires) as well as by the perceived quality of
alternatives (i.e., the degree to which specific alternative part-
ners, the field of eligibles, and the option of noninvolvement
are attractive). The investment model (cf. Rusbult, 1980, 1983)
extends interdependence theory by asserting that experienced
level of dependence is also affected by the size of prior invest-
ments in the relationship (i.e., the degree to which many im-
portant resources are linked to a relationship and would be lost
on termination).
The investment model places particular emphasis on the sub-
jective experience of dependence, termed commitment level, the
internal representation of long-term orientation, including the
feeling of being linked to a relationship, intending to maintain
it for better or worse (cf. Rusbult, 1980, 1983). Consistent with
interdependence theory and the investment model, it has been
well-established that strong commitment is associated with high
level of satisfaction (i.e., the positive forces that draw one to
a relationship), poor quality of alternatives (i.e., the external
constraints that block one from leaving a relationship), and
large investment size (i.e., the vested interests that bind one to
a relationship; e.g., Felmlee, Sprecher, & Bassin, 1990; Lund,
1985; Rusbult, 1980,1983; Simpson, 1987). Moreover, commit-
ment promotes several activities that may serve as relationship-
maintenance mechanisms, such as derogation of alternatives,
responses to dissatisfaction, and accommodation (i.e., the ten-
dency to respond constructively rather than destructively to a
partner's potentially destructive behavior; e.g., Johnson & Rus-
bult, 1989; Rusbult, Johnson, & Morrow, 1986; Rusbult, Verette,
Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991).
However, by focusing on relationship-maintenance mecha-
nisms, prior research on the investment model has devoted little
attention to prosocial motivation in close relationships. Granted,
accommodation shares some similarities with willingness to
sacrifice; yet, accommodation is more situation- or partner-spe-
cific (i.e., it is a response to partner's potentially destructive
behavior). In contrast, willingness to sacrifice embodies a more
general form of prosocial motivation, which can be evoked by
a variety of different situations in which partners' interests do
not entirely correspond. Moreover, thus far, only one article has
directly addressed willingness to sacrifice, providing prelimi-
1
 The current definition of sacrifice parallels the definition given in
Webster's New World Dictionary: "giving up one thing for another;
surrender to gain some other object; devote with loss" or "foregoing
something valued for the sake of something having a more pressing
claim." The current research focuses on willingness to sacrifice (rather
than actual sacrifice), because our primary interest is to advance our
knowledge of the determinants of the propensity to engage in sacrifice.
Levels of actual sacrifice are likely to be influenced not only by the
individual's willingness to sacrifice but also by the degree of correspon-
dence of outcomes (i.e., the frequency and intensity with which partners'
preferences conflict determine the extent to which a relationship calls
for sacrifice). Given that this is one of the first articles that addresses
sacrifice in close relationships, measuring willingness to sacrifice
seemed like a reasonable means of tapping the former while controlling
for the extent to which a relationship calls for sacrifices. This reasoning
also implies that the determinants underlying willingness to sacrifice
should parallel those underlying actual sacrifice, except that actual sacri-
fice is also determined by circumstances of the relationships itself (i.e.,
the extent to which such circumstances call for sacrifice).
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nary evidence in support of the claim that commitment is associ-
ated with enhanced willingness to sacrifice (Van Lange et al.,
1997). More important, extant research on the investment model
has not yet focused on why commitment may enhance prosocial
motivation as embodied by willingness to sacrifice.
Why should strong commitment promote willingness to sacri-
fice? We suggest two reasons, both of which are inherently
related to the concept of commitment. First, commitment repre-
sents dependence on a relationship or the extent to which an
individual needs the partner and relationship. To the extent that
individuals are more committed to their relationships, they
should be more willing to sacrifice direct self-interest in order
to sustain the relationship—the more you have to lose, the more
you should be willing to give up in order to hold on to what
you've got. Second, commitment represents long-term orienta-
tion; committed individuals look beyond the here and now, con-
sidering current noncorrespondcnce problems in light of the
future of the relationship. It seems plausible that individuals
recognize (consciously or unconsciously) that giving up some
immediate self-interest to solve situations of noncorrespondence
tends to contribute to the health and stability of the relationship
over the long run. By exhibiting sacrifice, an individual commu-
nicates commitment to the relationship and consideration to the
partner, thereby decreasing the odds that the partner questions
an individual's commitment or affection (cf. Kelley, 1979).
Thus, individuals with high commitment are likely to exhibit
high levels of sacrifice because they are strongly motivated to
pursue the well-being of the relationship now and in the future,
a motivation that parsimoniously can be understood in terms of
the pursuit of long-term personal well-being rather than the
pursuit of partner well-being.2
Disposition-Based Transformations:
The Role of Social Value Orientation
Transformational tendencies are also shaped by social dispo-
sitions. One such disposition extensively discussed by Kelley
and Thibaut (1978) has been referred to by Messick and
McCHntock (1968) as social value orientation, a personal dis-
position that is assumed to reflect preferences for particular
types of outcome transformations, reflecting the ways in which
outcomes for self and others are evaluated (cf. Knight, Dubro, &
Chao, 1985; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange & Kuhl-
man, 1994). The concept of social value orientation is rooted
in research on experimental games, a tradition largely inspired
by game theoretical principles (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Von Neu-
man & Morgenstern, 1947). Challenging the original assump-
tions underlying game theory, this research has revealed that
individuals1 preferences and behavior do not directly reflect the
logic dictated by rational self-interest. Indeed, the seminal work
of Messick and McClintock (1968) revealed that a substantial
number of individuals approach experimental games by consid-
ering not only their own outcomes but also the outcomes af-
forded to others.
Although a variety of social value orientations can be identi-
fied (cf. McClintock, 1972), in the current research we focus
on an empirically established typology that distinguishes be-
tween three broad groups of orientation: cooperation, individual-
ism, and competition (e.g., Grzelak, 1982; Kramer, McClin-
tock, & Messick, 1986; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Lie-
brand & Van Run, 1985; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).
Individuals with cooperative or prosocial orientation tend to
maximize the well-being of both self and others and to minimize
differences between the well-being of self and others (i.e., they
attend to the goodness of joint outcomes and to equality in
outcomes); individualists tend to maximize their own well-being
with little or no regard for the well-being of others (i.e., they
attend to the goodness of their own outcomes); and competitors
tend to maximize their own well-being in relation to the well-
being of others (i.e., they attend to the goodness of relative
outcomes).
Social value orientations have been demonstrated to exert
effects in interaction with the interdependence structure underly-
ing a relationship or with beliefs regarding partner's probable
behavior and orientation. Earlier work using iterated game situa-
tions (i.e., situations in which individuals are interdependent
over a series of choices) has addressed such Person X Situation
interactions, revealing that prosocials approach interdependent
others in a prosocial manner and continue to do so until the
interdependent other fails to exhibit prosocial behavior (e.g.,
McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975;
Sattler & Kerr, 1991). On the other hand, individualists engage
in prosocial behavior only if there are long-term self-oriented
reasons for doing so (e.g., if the other follows a tit-for-tat strat-
egy which rewards prosocial or cooperative behavior and pun-
ishes selfish, noncooperative behavior by imitating the previous
choice made by the interaction partner). Finally, competitors
are not willing to engage in prosocial behavior, even if the
interaction partner consistently exhibits prosocial behavior and
even if they themselves could benefit in the long run by doing
so (e.g., in response to a tit-for-tat strategy). This work suggests
that in relationships characterized by repeated interaction, pro-
social behavior by prosocials can be understood in terms of
their pursuit of a partner's well-being and desire for reciprocity;
prosocial behavior by individualists should be largely deter-
mined by considerations of long-term self-interest; and competi-
tors should not be particularly responsive to the well-being of
the partner or to long-term self-interest and therefore should
generally exhibit low levels of sacrifice (i.e., these individuals
seem most concerned with not being exploited by their partners
and coming out ahead).
One might ask whether findings observed in experimental
games have any bearing on the domain of ongoing close relation-
ships, in that there would seem to be important differences
between these two settings of interdependence. For example,
individuals may be more likely to engage in prosocial behavior
with their romantic partners than with persons they do not know
(i.e., in experimental games, the interdependent other typically
is an unknown other). However, we see no a priori reason why
2
 The assumption that commitment largely promotes long-term self-
interest is not to suggest that commitment is entirely unrelated to desire
to enhance the partner's well-being. For example, committed individuals
may experience strong attachment or may feel inclined to adopt a collec-
tivistic, communal orientation in such a manner that a departure from
self-interest benefiting the partner may not be experienced as a departure
from self-interest (cf. Clark & Mills, 1979; Clark, Mills, & Powell,
1986).
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such differences would modify the fundamental motivational
differences between prosocials, individualists, and competitors.
In particular, because dependence and long-term orientation as
well as partner behavior are critical in understanding behavior
in repeated game interactions, we assume that the motivational
differences between prosocials (i.e., concern with partner well-
being, reciprocity), individualists (i.e., short-term as well as
long-term personal well-being), and competitors (i.e., relative
benefit) are relevant to understanding prosocial behavior in on-
going relationships.
In what ways might social value orientation be related to
willingness to sacrifice in ongoing relationships? Earlier, we
outlined why it is plausible that the link between commitment—
representing dependence and long-term orientation—and sacri-
fice can predominantly be understood in terms of long-term
self-interest. Given that individualists are strongly motivated to
engage in prosocial behavior when such actions are believed to
serve long-term personal well-being, these individuals should
exhibit strong links between commitment and willingness to
sacrifice. Such links should be less pronounced for prosocials
because these individuals are likely to exhibit willingness to
sacrifice even when long-term personal well-being is not salient,
in that they are primarily concerned with partner well-being and
reciprocity. Finally, competitors should exhibit relatively weak
links between dependence and willingness to sacrifice because
these individuals by and large do not tend to pursue long-term
self-interest; they are primarily concerned with not being ex-
ploited, coupled with a tendency to prefer outcomes that are
superior to those of their partners.
Accordingly, we advanced three central hypotheses. First, we
predicted that greater willingness to sacrifice would be associ-
ated with higher levels of commitment (Hypothesis 1). Commit-
ment is assumed to be promoted by three specific commitment-
enhancing variables, representing positive feelings that draw one
to a relationship (high satisfaction), the external constraints
that block one from leaving a relationship (poor alternatives),
and the vested interests that bind one to a relationship (large
investment size). Therefore, we predicted that greater willing-
ness to sacrifice would be associated with greater levels of
satisfaction (Hypothesis la) , lower perceived quality of alterna-
tives (Hypothesis 1b), and greater investment size (Hypoth-
esis lc ) .
Second, on the basis of the assumption that the link between
commitment and sacrifice could largely be understood in terms
of considerations of long-term self-interest, we predicted that
relative to prosocials and competitors, individualists would ex-
hibit a stronger link between commitment and sacrifice (Hypoth-
esis 2) . Also, we examined whether any of the links predicted
in Hypotheses la, 1 b, and 1 c would be moderated by social value
orientation. In an exploratory vein, we advanced and tested three
specific hypotheses, predicting that relative to prosocials and
competitors, individualists would exhibit a stronger link between
satisfaction and sacrifice (Hypothesis 2a), quality of alternatives
and sacrifice (Hypothesis 2b), and investment size and sacrifice
(Hypothesis 2c). (Of course, this set of hypotheses does not
necessarily assume that social value orientation will moderate
all three links; for example, it could be that the subjective experi-
ence of dependence derived from satisfaction primarily guides
individualists' concern with long-term self-interest.)
Third, in light of the motivational differences between proso-
cials, individualists, and competitors, we advanced the predic-
tion that prosocials would exhibit greater levels of sacrifice
than individualists, who in turn would exhibit greater levels of
sacrifice than competitors (Hypothesis 3).
Partner-Based Transformations:
Role of Partner's Willingness to Sacrifice
A second goal of the present research was to examine the link
between one's own willingness to sacrifice and beliefs regarding
partner's willingness to sacrifice. Interdependence theory (Kel-
ley, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), as well as several other
theories relevant to interdependence (e.g., equity theory, justice
theories; Adams, 1965;Lerner&Lerner, 1981; Messick& Cook,
1983; McClintock, Kramer, & Keil, 1984; Mikula, 1980), states
that transformational tendencies are partially shaped by expecta-
tions or beliefs regarding prosocial intentions and behavior by
the partner. The basic argument is that individuals desire reci-
procity, seeking a balance between their own inputs and the
benefits they receive, or expect to receive, in return. Consistent
with this argument, there is evidence that reciprocity affects
prosocial behavior across a wide domain of interdependent rela-
tionships, including close relationships (e.g., Hatfield, Traup-
mann, Sprecher, Utne, & Hay, 1985). Accordingly, we advanced
the prediction that greater perceived partner willingness to sacri-
fice would be associated with greater levels of one's own will-
ingness to sacrifice (Hypothesis 4).3 However, that reciprocity
tends to be fairly characteristic of the functioning of many indi-
viduals in their close relationships is not to deny that there is also
considerable variation between individuals, with some feeling
3
 We expected the relationship between perceived partner's willing-
ness to sacrifice and one's own willingness to sacrifice to be quite strong,
in that the desire for reciprocity is unlikely to be the only determinant
underlying this link. Other mechanisms that are likely to contribute to
this relationship are assumed similarity, or tendencies to project own
motivations and behaviors onto the partner, and post hoc justification,
or rationalizing one's own levels of sacrifice by coloring judgments
of the partner's willingness to sacrifice (cf. Messe & Sivacek, 1979).
Moreover, such relationships may also be partially accounted for by real
similarity (i.e., people who are willing to sacrifice seek one another
out) and modeling (i.e., observing a sacrifice by the partner may remind
an individual that he or she, too, should behave well). We should note
that an assumption underlying the desire for reciprocity is that beliefs
regarding a partner's willingness to sacrifice largely determine one's
own willingness to sacrifice. Given that the other mechanisms (i.e.,
assumed similarity and justification) suggest the importance of the re-
verse causal direction, it would have been desirable to manipulate beliefs
regarding partner's willingness to sacrifice, thereby providing an empiri-
cal test of the claim that these variables, at least in part, affect willingness
to sacrifice. However, in the context of ongoing, close relationships, it
would be exceedingly difficult to directly test the direction of causality
(i.e., one cannot effectively manipulate beliefs regarding a partner's
willingness to sacrifice in ongoing relationships). Thus, the current re-
search does not attempt to test the direction of causality underlying
links between one's own willingness to sacrifice and beliefs regarding
partner's willingness to sacrifice. (For the same reason, we did not
seek to manipulate levels of commitment to demonstrate its effects on
willingness to sacrifice.)
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overbenefited and others feeling underbenefited (e.g., Hatfield
et al., 1985; Sprecher, 1986).
Might social value orientation be related to this variation in
reciprocity, overbenefit, and underbenefit? If so, how? Recall
that at least in the context of experimental games, prosocials'
behavior tends to be more strongly guided by considerations of
reciprocity than the behavior of individualists and competitors,
who exhibit tendencies to exploit, rather than reciprocate, proso-
cial behavior by interdependent others. Accordingly, from this
perspective, one might advance the prediction that individualists
and competitors would exhibit a pronounced tendency to exhibit
lower levels of sacrifice relative to the level of sacrifice ascribed
to the partner, whereas prosocials should ascribe similar levels
of sacrifice to themselves and their partners (Hypothesis 5).
Alternatively, given that prosocials tend to be especially con-
cerned with the partner's well-being, prosocials might be partic-
ularly responsive to the partner's needs, irrespective of whether
they expect benefits from the partner in return (i.e., prosocials
would exhibit a communal orientation; cf. Clark & Mills, 1979).
In contrast, individualists and competitors may be more strongly
inclined to keep a record of balances of input and benefits,
ensuring that their own inputs do not exceed the benefits they
might receive in return (cf. exchange orientation, Clark & Mills,
1979; aversive competition, Messick & Thorngate, 1967).
Hence, an alternative hypothesis states that the relationship be-
tween one's own willingness to sacrifice and partner's willing-
ness to sacrifice would be more pronounced for individualists
and competitors than for prosocials. Thus, in an exploratory
vein, the present research explored the validity of Hypothesis
5, a prediction based on evidence obtained in prior research on
experimental games.
Study 1
The preceding line of reasoning provides an interdependence
framework for understanding motivations relevant to willingness
to sacrifice. Study 1 was a cross-national study (conducted in
the United States and the Netherlands), designed to test Hypoth-
eses 1 through 5.
Method
Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and the Free University, Amster-
dam, the Netherlands. The U.S. sample participated in partial fulfilment
of requirements for an introductory psychology class. The Dutch sample
was recruited at the university cafeteria and library as well as at locations
other than the university campus (e.g., restaurants and waiting halls at
train stations). The main reason for recruiting participants in both the
United States and the Netherlands, and at places other than the university
campus, was to minimize restriction of range and to provide a basis
for some generalizability of the current findings across differing dating
relationships.
The procedure involved first administering a series of decomposed
games (to be described shortly) in order to assess social value orienta-
tion. This task, described as a decision-making task, was also completed
by participants who were not involved in ongoing dating relationships
(upon completion, these participants were either thanked for their partic-
ipation and debriefed at the Free University or asked to participate in
another study at the University of North Carolina). Those who were
involved in a dating relationship proceeded with the instrument measur-
ing dependence-relevant features of relationships, own willingness to
sacrifice, and perceived partner willingness to sacrifice. Because we
wanted to avoid the possibility that the measurement of social value
orientation would be influenced by concerns regarding the current rela-
tionship, participants were not informed that the study included ques-
tions about the current relationship until they completed the instrument
measuring social value orientation.
We recruited 200 U.S. participants (77 men and 123 women) and
136 Dutch participants (73 men and 63 women). On average, partici-
pants were 21 years old and had been involved for nearly 2 years (mean
duration was 23 months). Comparison of the two samples revealed that,
relative to U.S. participants, Dutch participants were older (A/s = 19.48
vs. 23.67, respectively), F ( l , 291) - 166.94, p < .001, and had been
involved with their partners almost twice as long (Ms - 17.60 vs. 31.42
months, respectively), F ( l , 291) - 25.39, p < .001.
Measuring social value orientation. The study first administered a
series of nine decomposed games to assess social value orientation
(Messick & McClintock, 1968; cf. Pruitt, 1970). This task was de-
scribed as a decision-making task and involved making choices between
specific combinations of outcomes for oneself and for an (hypothetical)
other. The other person was said to be someone they did not know and
whom they would not meet during the course of the study {so as to
measure individuals' general tendencies toward others). Outcomes were
presented in terms of points, and participants were asked to imagine
that the points had value to themselves as well as to the other person
(e.g., "Every point has value: The more points you receive, the better
for you, and the more points the other receives, the better for him or
her"). These instructions are identical to those used in prior research
(e.g., Sattler & Ken; 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).
As in most research on social value orientations, we administered
decomposed games in which participants were given a choice among
three options, each corresponding to one of the three social value orienta-
tions under study. An example is the following: Option A, 480 points
for self and 80 points for other; Option B, 540 points for self and 280
points for other; and Option C, 480 points for self and 480 points for
other. In this example. Option A represents the competitive choice be-
cause it yields a larger difference between one's own and the other's
outcomes (480 - 80 = 400) than either Option B (540 - 280 = 260)
or Option C (480 - 480 = 0) . Option B represents the individualistic
choice because one's own outcomes are larger (540) than are those in
Option A (480) or Option C (480). Finally, Option C represents the
prosocial choice because it provides a larger joint outcome (480 + 480
= 960) than does either Option A (480 + 80 = 560) or Option B (540
+ 280 = 820) and because Option C provides a smaller discrepancy
between one's own and other's outcomes (480 — 480 = 0) than does
either Option A (480 - 80 = 400) or Option B (540 - 280 - 260).
The decomposed game measurement technique has been demonstrated
to have good internal consistency (e.g., Liebrand & Van Run, 1985)
and test-retest reliability over substantial periods of time (i.e., 19
months; Van Lange & Schuyt, 1997; see also Dehue, McClintock, &
Liebrand, 1993; Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986). Also, social value
orientations, as measured by the current nine-item decomposed game
measure, are not related to tendencies toward favorable self-presentation
or to measures of mood (e.g., Platow, 1992; Van Lange, Otten, De
Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Finally, there is increasing evidence that
social value orientations are predictive of cognition and behavior in
many settings of interdependence, supporting the ecological validity of
social value orientation (e.g., negotiation, De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995;
helping behavior, McClintock & Allison, 1989; environmental decision
making, Van Vugt, Van Lange, & Meertens, 1996).
As in previous research (e.g., McClintock & Allison, 1989; Van
Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), participants were classified if they made at
least six of the nine choices consistent with one of the three social value
orientations. Using these criteria, we identified 178 prosocials (61%),
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74 individualists (25%), and 42 competitors (14%) across the two
samples (42 individuals made fewer than six consistent choices and thus
were not classified). This distribution is similar to that observed in prior
research (e.g., Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; Van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994). Moreover, the distributions of social value orientations were not
significantly different, x 2 (2 , N = 294) = 2.66, ns, for the U.S. (64.5%
prosocials, 22.5% individualists, and 13% competitors) and Dutch sam-
ples (55% prosocials, 29% individualists, and 16% competitors) nor for
women and men, x 2 (2 , JV = 294) = 1.83, ns (for related findings, see
Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).
Measuring commitment and commitment-enhancing variables. The
measurement of the dependence-relevant features of relationships was
based on prior work on the investment model (e.g., Rusbult, 1983;
Rusbult et al., 1991). Among the Dutch sample, we used Dutch transla-
tions of the scale for commitment level, which was tested and validated
by Van Lange, Rusbult, et al. (1997). Commitment level was measured
with six items (e.g., "Do you feel committed to maintaining your rela-
tionship with your partner?" 0 = not at all, 8 = very much; "For how
much longer do you want your relationship to last?" 0 = a month or
less, 4 = twelve months, 8 = ten years or more; a = .82). Satisfaction
level was measured with four items (e.g., "All things considered, to
what degree do you feel satisfied with your relationship?'' 0 = not at
all satisfied, 8 = completely satisfied; a = .85). Quality of alternatives
was measured with four items (e.g., ' 'How attractive are the people other
than your current partner with whom you could become involved?"' 0
= alternatives are not at all appealing, 8 = alternatives are extremely
appealing; "How do your alternatives [dating another, spending time
alone, etc.] compare to your relationship with your partner?" 0 = alter-
natives are much worse, 8 = alternatives are much better). The internal
consistency was lower than ideal (a = .59}, but was judged acceptable
in that the items tap multifaceted aspects of alternatives (i.e., evaluation
of specific alternative partners, the field of eligibles, and the option of
noninvolvement) and because this measure has been widely used in past
research. Finally, investment size was measured with four items (e.g.,
"Have you put things into your relationship that you would in some
sense lose if the relationship were to end [e.g., time spent together;
secrets disclosed to one another]?" 0 = put nothing into relationship,
8 = put everything into relationship; a — .68).
Measuring willingness to sacrifice. Given our definition of willing-
ness to sacrifice, it is important diat participants are confronted with a
situation in which they must weigh the activities they find important
against the interests of their partners or relationships (cf. "situations of
noncorrepondence;" Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Individuals differ in what
activities they view as desirable or important and, hence, as potentially
self-sacrificial (e.g., to some individuals, spending time with dieir friends
is important, whereas to others playing soccer is important). Accord-
ingly, the current measure of willingness to sacrifice focuses on noncor-
respondent situations in which issues or activities generated by the parti-
cipants themselves (rather than the experimenter) are pitted against the
well-being of the partner or relationship. This measure, which extends
and complements methodologies inspired by game theory, has been de-
veloped and validated in prior research (Van Lange, Rusbult, et al.,
1997).
Specifically, in measuring individuals' willingness to sacrifice, each
individual was asked to list, in order, the three * 'most important activities
in your life, other than your relationship with your partner." As in
prior research (Van Lange, Rusbult et al., 1997), individuals listed life
domains, such as parents and siblings, career, education, religion, friends,
or pastimes (e.g., playing soccer, watching television). Then, we created
a conflict between each of these (self-generated) activities and involve-
ment with the partner, asking participants to rate the extent to which
they were willing to give up each activity. Specifically, the instructions
read: ' 'Imagine that it were not possible to combine activity No. 1 with
your current relationship (for reasons unrelated to your partner: It is
not his or her fault that these cannot be combined). To what extent are
you willing to give up that activity?" For each activity, ratings were
made using a 9-point scale (0 = not at all willing to give up that activity,
8 = very strongly willing to give up that activity). The resultant three-
item scale exhibited acceptable internal consistency (a = .68), and as
would be desired, mean levels of sacrifice varied in increasing order of
activity importance: The respective means for the first, second, and third
most important activities were 1.67, 2.49, and 3.71.
In a parallel fashion, we measured individuals' beliefs regarding their
partners' willingness to sacrifice. Participants first generated the first,
second, and third most important activities in the partner's life. Subse-
quently, they were asked to ' 'Imagine that it was not possible for your
partner to combine activity No. 1 with your current relationship (for
reasons unrelated to you: It is not your fault that these cannot be com-
bined). To what extent do you think your partner would be willing to
give up that activity?" For each activity, ratings were made using a 9-
point scale (0 = not at all willing to give up that activity, 8 - very
strongly willing to give up that activity). The resultant three-item scale
revealed good internal consistency (a = .76). As would be desired,
mean levels of sacrifice varied in increasing order of activity importance:
The respective means for the first, second, and third most important
activities were 2.28, 3.10, and 4.09.
The instructions were identical at both locations at which the study
was conducted (i.e., Chapel Hill and Amsterdam). The first page of the
questionnaire described that the responses were anonymous, that they
could complete this questionnaire at their leisure (although the instruc-
tions stated that participants should not think too long about one particu-
lar question), and that they should not page through the questionnaire
but turn to the next page once they had completed all questions on the
previous page. Also, the questionnaire used a fixed order in which the
differing scales were administered (i.e., decomposed games, measures
of commitment, satisfaction, alternatives, investment size, and both mea-
sures of willingness to sacrifice). However, there was one difference
between the instructions used in both samples. In the U.S. sample, one's
own willingness to sacrifice was assessed prior to assessing beliefs
regarding partner's willingness to sacrifice. In the Dutch sample, we
counterbalanced the order in which one's own versus partner's willing-
ness to sacrifice were assessed. Preliminary analyses indicated that order
had no systematic influence on levels of sacrifice or on the strength of
links between sacrifice and other variables tapped in this work, so this
variable will not be discussed further.
The analyses reported below are based on a total of 257 individuals
(156 prosocials, 66 individualists, and 35 competitors); 42 individuals
could not be classified in terms of their dominant social value orientation,
and the data for another 37 were deleted because of missing values for
the measures of commitment, satisfaction, alternatives, investments,
one's own willingness to sacrifice, or partner's willingness to sacrifice.
Thus, all of the analyses are based on an equal number of individuals.
Preliminary analyses indicated that the results were not altered by using
a less conservative selection procedure (i.e., when those with missing
values were included in the analyses).
Results
Analysis overview. To test Hypotheses l a - l c , Hypotheses
2a-2c, and Hypothesis 3, we performed both correlational and
regression analyses. The results of correlational analyses are
summarized in Table 1 and will be discussed in combination
with the results of two distinct regression analyses. The first
analysis focuses on differences between prosocials and individu-
alists, regressing willingness to sacrifice onto commitment level,
the contrast between prosocials and individualists, and the inter-
action of commitment level and this contrast. The second analy-
sis focuses on differences between individualists and competi-
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Table 1
Correlations Between Investment Model Variables and Willingness to Sacrifice in Study 1
Variable
Commitment
Satisfaction
Alternatives
Willingness to sacrifice
Prosocials
Individualists
Competitors
Commitment
36* **
93 **
.55 b***
• 1 7 a
Satisfaction
33***
• 1 8 , *
Alternatives
-.50***
_ 32***
_ 33***
— 3 3 h * * *
_ 57 ***
--02.
Investments
47***
.45***
— 26***
3 3 * * *
.23 a**
si ***
•48ab**
Note. Prosocials (n = 156), individualists (n = 66), competitors (n = 35). Correlations with different
subscripts per column indicate significant differences (p < .05, tested after Fisher r-ta-z transformation)
between prosocials, individualists, and competitors in the size of the correlations of willingness to sacrifice
with commitment, satisfaction, alternatives, and investments. Tests for correlations being different from zero
are indicated by asterisk.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
tors, regressing willingness to sacrifice onto commitment level,
the contrast between individualists and competitors, and the in-
teraction of commitment level and this contrast. (We should note
that these regressions analyses are also relevant to Hypothesis 3;
support for this hypothesis would be revealed by effects for
social value orientation contrasts. However, these tests will not
be discussed because the regression analysis provides only tests
of contrasts between two groups of social value orientation.
Later, we will report the results of an analysis that compares
all three groups of social value orientation, thus providing a
more comprehensive test of Hypothesis 3.)4
Analyses focusing on prosocials versus individualists: Tests
of Hypotheses 1 and 2. In the first analysis, we regressed
willingness to sacrifice onto commitment level, the contrast be-
tween prosocials and individualists, and the interaction of com-
mitment level with this contrast. Consistent with Hypothesis 1,
the analysis revealed an association between commitment level
and sacrifice, p = .32, r(218) - 4.96,/? < .001. Table 1 reveals
that greater commitment is associated with enhanced levels of
sacrifice (see row labeled Willingness to sacrifice). Second, the
analysis revealed a significant interaction of commitment level
and the prosocials versus individualists contrast, p = .14, r(218)
— 2.10, p < .05. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Table 1 reveals
a greater association between commitment and sacrifice for indi-
vidualists than for prosocials (the link between commitment
and sacrifice was significant albeit weaker for prosocials).
Next, continuing our focus on the difference between proso-
cials and individualists, we performed three specific regression
analyses in order to test the two sets of subhypotheses (Hypothe-
ses la, lb, lc and Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c). In these analyses,
sacrifice was regressed onto each commitment-enhancing vari-
able (i.e., satisfaction, alternatives, and investments), the proso-
cials versus individualists contrast, and the interaction of each
commitment-enhancing variable and this contrast. Relevant to
Hypotheses la, lb, and lc, these analyses revealed significant
main effects of each commitment-enhancing variable: satisfac-
tion, /? = .28, /(218) = 4.24, p < .001; quality of alternatives,
0 = - . 4 1 , f(218) = -6.67, p < .001; and investment size, P
= .31, /(218) = 4.86. p < .001. Consistent with Hypotheses
1a, lb. and lc, Table 1 reveals that greater willingness to sacri-
fice was associated with high satisfaction, poor alternatives, and
large investment size (see row labeled Willingness to sacrifice).
Relevant to Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, these analyses revealed
two significant interactions of a commitment-enhancing variable
with the prosocials versus individualists contrast. First, a sig-
nificant interaction of satisfaction and this contrast, /? — .14,
f(218) = 2.21, p < .05, revealed a greater association between
satisfaction and sacrifice for individualists than for prosocials
(the link between satisfaction and sacrifice was significant albeit
weaker for prosocials; see Table 1). Second, a significant inter-
action of quality of alternatives and the contrast, 0 = —.13,
f(218) — -2.12,/? < .05, revealed a greater association between
quality of alternatives and sacrifice for individualists than for
prosocials (the link between quality of alternatives and sacrifice
was significant albeit weaker for prosocials; see Table 1). Third,
the interaction of investment size and the contrast was margin-
ally significant, 0 = .12, f(218) = 1.89, p < .10, revealing a
somewhat more pronounced association between investment
size and sacrifice for individualists than for prosocials (the link
between investment size and sacrifice was significant albeit
weaker for prosocials; see Table 1). Thus, these analyses pro-
vide good evidence in support of Hypothesis 2a and 2b and
somewhat weaker support for Hypothesis 2c.
Analyses focusing on individualists versus competitors: Tests
of Hypotheses 1 and 2. We conducted an analysis in which
willingness to sacrifice was regressed onto commitment level,
the contrast between individualists and competitors, and the in-
4
 One could argue that it would be desirable to test Hypotheses 1-3,
as well as Hypotheses 4 and 5, in a single analysis, regressing willingness
to sacrifice onto commitment, social value orientation, beliefs regarding
partner's willingness to sacrifice (as well as onto gender and nation)
and all possible interactions. We did not perform such an analysis. The
most important reason was that we anticipated a substantial link between
one's own willingness to sacrifice and beliefs regarding partner's will-
ingness to sacrifice because of the several mechanisms that are likely
to promote such a link (i.e., reciprocity, assumed similarity, and self-
justification). Accordingly, beliefs regarding partner's willingness to sac-
rifice would be likely to account for substantial amounts of variance,
leaving lower levels of variance to be explained by other variables that
were more central to the current research.
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teraction of commitment level and this contrast. Consistent with
Hypothesis 1, the regression analysis revealed an association
between commitment level and sacrifice, /3 = .41, ((97) = 4.57,
p < .001. Table 1 reveals that greater commitment is associated
with enhanced levels of sacrifice (see row labeled Willingness
to sacrifice). Second, the analysis revealed a marginal interac-
tion of commitment level and the contrast, f3 - .16, /(218) =
1.83, p < .10. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Table 1 reveals a
greater association between commitment and sacrifice for indi-
vidualists than for competitors (the link between commitment
and sacrifice was nonsignificant for competitors).
To test two sets of specific hypotheses (i.e., Hypotheses la,
lb, and lc, and Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c), we performed three
specific regression analyses. In these analyses, sacrifice is re-
gressed onto each commitment-enhancing variable (i.e., satisfac-
tion, alternatives, and investments), the contrast between individu-
alists and competitors, and the interaction of each commitment-
enhancing variable with this contrast. Consistent with Hypotheses
la, lb, and lc, these analyses revealed significant main effects
of each commitment-enhancing variable: satisfaction, p = .45,
*(97) = 5.03, p < .001; quality of alternatives, (3 = - .39, r(97)
= -4.36, p < .001; and investment size, (3 = .50, r(97) = 5.76,
p < .001. Relevant to Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, the analyses
revealed one significant interaction involving the individualists
versus competitors contrast, the interaction between quality of
alternatives and social value orientation, fi = —.28, t(91) =
—3.12, p < .01. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, Table 1 reveals
a greater association between quality of alternatives and sacrifice
for individualists than for competitors (the link between quality
of alternatives and sacrifice was nonsignificant for competitors).
Neither the interaction of satisfaction and the contrast, 0 = .11,
f(97) = 1.32, ns, nor the interaction of investment size and the
contrast, j3 = .03, £(97) = .40, ns, were significant. Thus, the
links between satisfaction and sacrifice and investment size and
sacrifice were not significantly more pronounced for individual-
ists lhan for competitors (see also Table I) .5
Mean levels of sacrifice: Tests of Hypothesis 3. To provide
a comprehensive test of Hypothesis 3, we conducted a 3 (social
value orientation: prosocials vs. individualists vs. competitors)
x 2 (nation) X 2 (gender) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
willingness to sacrifice. Relevant to Hypothesis 3, we observed
a marginally significant main effect of social value orientation,
F ( l , 245) - 2.78, p < .10. Prosocials (M = 2.77, SD =1.83)
exhibited greatest levels of sacrifice, immediately followed by
individualists (M — 2.66, SD = 1.96), with competitors exhib-
iting lowest levels of sacrifice (M = 2.16, SD = 1.87). Planned
comparisons revealed that the only significant difference was
the difference between prosocials and competitors, r(189) =
1.76, p< .05.
Relationships among commitment and commitment-enhanc-
ing variables. Consistent with the assumption that commit-
ment level represents three specific commitment-enhancing vari-
ables (i.e., satisfaction, quality of alternatives, and investment
size), Table 1 reveals that greater levels of commitment are
associated with higher levels of satisfaction, with lower quality
of alternatives, and with larger investment size (see row labeled
Commitment) ,6 We should note that very few of these links were
moderated by social value orientation. Of 18 tests comparing
differences in the size of the correlations between prosocials,
individualists, and competitors (six correlations for each group
of social value orientation), only one comparison was signifi-
cant, tested after Fisher's r-to-z transformation: For prosocials,
there was a lower correlation between satisfaction and invest-
ments, r(156) = .37, than for individualists, r(66) = .60; z =
2.04, p < .05.
Next, we examined possible differences between prosocials,
individualists, and competitors, as well as between U.S. and Dutch
participants, in levels of commitment, satisfaction, quality of al-
ternatives, and investments. Accordingly, we conducted a series
of 3 (social value orientation) x 2 (nation) X 2 (gender) ANO-
VAs. These analyses yielded no significant main effects or interac-
tions involving social value orientation. Thus, these analyses re-
veal that social value orientation does not tend to be systemati-
cally related to any of the investment model variables, nor does
it moderate the relationships among investment model variables.7
Associations between self-sacrifice and partner sacrifice:
Tests of Hypotheses 4 and 5. To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, we
computed the correlation between level of sacrifice ascribed to
self (i.e., self-sacrifice) and level of sacrifice ascribed to the
partner (i.e., partner sacrifice). Consistent with Hypothesis 4,
the association between these variables was quite strong for all
groups of social value orientations: prosocials, r(156) = .68,
p < .001; individualists, r(66) = .52,p < .001; and competitors,
r(35) = .66,/? < .001. Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the corre-
lation obtained for prosocials was significantly greater than that
for individualists, z = 1.69, p < .05. However, the correlations
for prosocials and competitors did not significantly differ.
Next, we tested Hypothesis 5 in a 3 (social value orientation)
X 2 (nation) X (gender) X 2 (target of sacrifice: self vs. part-
ner) ANOVA, the latter variable being a within-participant fac-
tor. This analysis revealed a main effect for target of sacrifice,
F ( l , 245) = 23.81, p < .001. Levels of sacrifice attributed to
5
 These correlational and regression analyses were also complemented
by a series of 3 (social value orientation) X 2 (commitment level: high
vs. low) X 2 (gender) X 2 (nation) ANOV\s using median splits to
discriminate between high versus low commitment (satisfaction, alterna-
tives, and investments). These analyses provided equally strong or
stronger evidence for our hypotheses (i.e., Hypotheses 1, l a - l c ; 2, 2a-
2c). We also performed a series of regression analyses in which we
included possible main effects and interactions involving nation and
gender. These regressions also provided evidence in support of our
hypotheses. As was the case for the ANOVAs, these regression analyses
revealed no consistent evidence in support of main effects or interactions
involving nation or gender.
6
 These correlations were complemented by a regression analysis in
which commitment was regressed simultaneously onto satisfaction, alter-
natives, and investment. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Rusbult et
al., 1991), this analysis revealed that satisfaction, (3 = .60, t = 14.80,
p < .001; alternatives @ = - .28 , t = -7.46, p < .001; and investments
{3 = .12, t = 3.12, p < .005 made independent contributions toward
predicting commitment, providing evidence for the claim that commit-
ment is enhanced by each of these investment model variables.
7
 This analysis did reveal a main effect of nation on quality of alterna-
tives, F ( l , 245) = 22.53, p < .001, indicating that, relative to U.S.
participants, Dutch participants perceived their alternatives as less attrac-
tive (Ms = 4.63 vs. 3.73; SDs = 1.39 and 1.14). Also, there was a
significant main effect of gender on commitment, F ( l , 245) = 7.55, p
< .01, revealing that women (A/ = 6.02, SD = 1.64) exhibited greater
commitment than did men (M = 5.27, SD = 1.83).
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the partner (M = 3.20, SD = 2.10) were greater than those
attributed to self (M - 2.66, SD = 1.87). Consistent with
Hypothesis 5, a significant interaction of social value orientation
and target of sacrifice, F(2, 245) = 3.09, p < .05, revealed that
this partner versus self difference was most pronounced for
individualists (Ms - 3.61 vs. 2.66, a difference of 0.95; SDs —
2.25 and 1.96), followed by competitors (Ms = 2.86 vs. 2.16,
a difference of 0.70; SDs = 1.93 and 1.87), and being least
pronounced for prosocials (Ms - 3.11 vs. 2.77, a difference of
0.34; SDs = 2.06 and 1.82). Subsequent planned comparisons
revealed that these differences were significant only for the con-
trast between prosocials and individualists, f(220) = 2.45, p
< .05. The only other significant effect we observed was an
interaction effect of gender and nation, F( 1, 245) = 5.41, p <
.05, revealing that levels of sacrifice ascribed to self and the
partner were greater among Dutch men (M = 3.36, SD - 1.89)
than among U.S. men (M = 2.54, SD = 1.76), whereas such
differences were not significant among Dutch women and U.S.
women (Ms = 3.15 vs. 2.84; SDs = 1.66 and 1.71).
Discussion
Study 1 provided good evidence in support of two central
hypotheses (i.e., Hypotheses 1 and 2) . Consistent with Hypothe-
sis 1, commitment was associated with willingness to sacrifice,
and consistent with Hypothesis 2, the link between commitment
and willingness to sacrifice was more pronounced among indi-
vidualists than among prosocials (and to some extent competi-
tors). Also, each of the commitment-enhancing variables was
associated with willingness to sacrifice (i.e., evidence in support
of Hypothesis l a - l c ) , and the links between satisfaction and
sacrifice and between alternatives and sacrifice were more pro-
nounced among individualists than among prosocials or compet-
itors (i.e., evidence in support of Hypotheses 2a and 2b; contrary
to Hypothesis 2c, the link between investment size and sacrifice
was not significantly more pronounced among individualists
than among prosocials or competitors). However, Study 1 re-
vealed weak evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, the prediction
that prosocials would exhibit a greater willingness to sacrifice
than individualists and competitors (i.e., there was some ten-
dency for competitors to exhibit lower willingness to sacrifice
relative to prosocials).
Congruent with Hypothesis 4, Study 1 revealed a strong asso-
ciation between one's own willingness to sacrifice and perceived
partner's willingness to sacrifice. As noted earlier, in addition
to the desire for reciprocity, this link could be accounted for by
tendencies toward assumed or real similarity, post hoc justifica-
tion, or modeling. However, given that this link was found to
be more pronounced among prosocials than among individual-
ists (i.e., some evidence in support of Hypothesis 5), it seems
likely that tendencies toward reciprocity, at least in part, ac-
counted for the association between one's own willingness to
sacrifice and beliefs regarding partner's willingness to sacrifice.
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to extend and complement Study 1 in
a variety of ways. First, given that Study 1 assessed social value
orientation and commitment just before the measurement of
willingness to sacrifice, it is possible that the contiguity of these
measures sensitized participants to respond in a consistent man-
ner (e.g., self-presentation concerns). Also, in light of the evi-
dence that prosocial behavior tends to be promoted by positive
mood (cf. Isen, 1987), we cannot exclude the possibility that
temporary states (e.g., day-to-day differences in mood) influ-
enced all three measures in a similar manner. (However, this
latter argument is at odds with the finding that the measurement
of social value orientation is not related to mood; Van Lange &
Schuyt, 1997.) Thus, it becomes important to assess both com-
mitment and social value orientation in such a manner that their
links with willingness to sacrifice are unlikely to be influenced
by artifacts stemming from tendencies toward self-presentation
or third variables such as temporary mood states.
Study 2 assessed commitment and social value orientation at
Time 3 and measured willingness to sacrifice at Time 2 research
sessions conducted 9 months later. Accordingly, Study 2 sought
to provide evidence relevant to the claim that earlier levels of
commitment are associated with later sacrifice. Also, on the
basis of the assumption that social value orientation reflects
relatively stable individual differences, we examined whether
social value orientation moderates the link between the pre-
sumed antecedent (i.e., early commitment) and later levels of
willingness to sacrifice. Given that one's own willingness to
sacrifice and beliefs regarding partner's willingness to sacrifice
were assessed at Time 2, Hypotheses 4 and 5 will be tested in
a cross-sectional manner.
Study 2 examines couples rather than individuals, thereby
extending Study 1 in at least two respects. First, we wished to
examine actual reciprocity, or mutuality of willingness to sacri-
fice, predicting an association between the partners' self-re-
ported willingness to sacrifice. Indeed, a demonstration of such
an association suggests some desire for reciprocity that is un-
likely to be accounted for by tendencies toward assumed similar-
ity or self-justification. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was tested by exam-
ining not only the link between one's own willingness to sacri-
fice and beliefs regarding partner's willingness to sacrifice, but
also the link between one's own willingness to sacrifice and
partner's self-reported willingness to sacrifice. Second, as noted
earlier, the measure of willingness to sacrifice has been validated
in prior research (e.g., links with actual sacrifice, links with
actual breakup; Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997). To further
evaluate the validity of our measure of willingness to sacrifice,
we wished to demonstrate that an individual's willingness to
sacrifice exhibits a link with the partner's beliefs regarding the
individual's willingness to sacrifice.
In a more exploratory vein, the current research examines
whether commitment would be predictive of breakup assessed
18 months later, thereby seeking to complement prior research
that revealed that greater levels of commitment are associated
with lower odds of breakup over smaller periods of time (e.g.,
6 months, Rusbult, 1983; 8 weeks, Van Lange, Rusbult, et al.,
1997). Moreover, Study 2 was conducted in the Netherlands,
thereby complementing the two above studies that were con-
ducted in the United States.
Method
Participants. A total of 37 Dutch couples (i.e., 74 individuals) par-
ticipated in both Time 1 and Time 2 research sessions. Participants were
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recruited by means of an advertisement placed in a local university
paper, inviting couples who had been involved for at least 3 months to
participate in a study of dating relationships. At Time 1, the average
age of the 74 participants was 22 years. They had been involved for about
2 years and 6 months (30.14 months). For Time 1 research sessions, we
recruited 86 couples. However, at Time 2, 9 months later, 10 couples*
relationships had ended and 39 couples could not be contacted or were
unable or unwilling to participate (i.e., in the Netherlands, it has become
fairly common for students to go abroad for substantial amounts of time
to complete their studies; also, several participants had finished their
studies and found jobs elsewhere; so, frequently, one or both partners
could not be contacted; participants who did not participate in Time 2
sessions did not significantly differ from Time 2 participants in terms
of commitment level or social value orientation). At both Times 1 and
2, we administered several other measures (e.g., attachment style and
measures regarding direct and indirect experience with relationships);
however, because these measures are not relevant to the present research,
they will not be discussed.
Procedure. One to four couples attended each research session.
Upon arrival, each couple was greeted and escorted to one of eight
cubicles, preventing them from communicating with each other. In each
cubicle, a participant was seated in front of a computer, which adminis-
tered the questionnaires. After receiving brief instructions regarding
computer use, participants were told that they could consult the experi-
menter if they had problems understanding the instructions. At the
end of both research sessions, participants were debriefed and paid
about $9.
Time 1: Measuring social value orientation and commitment. Social
value orientation was assessed using the same series of nine decomposed
games as welt as the same criteria for classification as in Study 1.
We identified 34 prosocials (52%), 21 individualists (32%), and 10
competitors (15%), a distribution that is similar to that obtained in prior
research (see Study 1). A total of 9 individuals made fewer than six
consistent choices and were not classified. Moreover, the distributions
of social value orientations among men and women were not significantly
different, ;<;3(2, N = 65) = 2.10, ns. Also, disregarding the unclassifi-
ables, 11 couples were comprised of individuals with identical social
value orientations (7 couples with 2 prosocials, 2 couples with 2 individ-
ualists, and 2 couples with 2 competitors), and 17 couples were com-
prised of individuals with different social value orientations. Thus, there
was no reliable relationship between individuals' social value orienta-
tions and those of their partners, x2(% N = 65) = 6.65, ns.
Given the low base rate of competitors (i.e., 10%-20%; cf. Lie-
brand & Van Run, 1985; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), it is not uncom-
mon in research on social value orientation to perform tests in which
just two groups of social value orientation are compared. For some
designs and some topics of research, it is common practice to either
combine individualists and competitors into one group of pro-selfs (e.g.,
Iedema & Poppe, 1994; Kramer et al., 1986; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, &
Suhre, 1986) or lo exclude competitors from the analyses (e.g., Sattler &
Kerr, 1991; Van Vugt et al., 1996). Given that our hypotheses involve
differences between individualists and competitors, we could not com-
bine these two groups; thus, in our analyses, we focus on differences
between prosocials and individualists, excluding competitors (n = 10)
because of low sample size.
The instrument used to measure commitment level was based on
previous work regarding the investment model, using Dutch translations.
Commitment level was measured with eight items (a = .79).
Time 2: Measuring willingness to sacrifice. Willingness to sacrifice
(i.e., one's own sacrifice) as well as beliefs regarding partner's willing-
ness to sacrifice were assessed as in Study 1. These respective measures
exhibited acceptable internal consistencies (as = .78 and .78). As would
be desired, mean levels of own sacrifice varied in increasing order of
activity importance: The respective means for the first, second, and third
Table 2
Results of Correlational and Regression Analyses Examining
Associations Between Time 1 Commitment and Time 2
Willingness to Sacrifice in Study 2
Variable
Main effect
Commitment
Social value
Commitment X Social Value
Among prosocials
Among individualists
Correlation
with sacrifice
33**
.26*
.04,
.53b**
0
.27*
.22t
.26*
Overall model
F df p
4.20 3,51 <.0l
Note. Prosocials (n = 34), individualists (n = 21). Correlations with
different subscripts indicate significant differences (p < .05, tested after
Fisher's r-to-z transformation) between prosocials and individualists in
the size of the correlations of commitment with willingness to sacrifice.
Tests for correlations and betas being different from zero are indicated
by asterisk.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. tp < .10 (marginally significant).
most important activities were 2.84, 3.14, and 3.49. Moreover, mean
levels of beliefs regarding partner willingness to sacrifice also varied in
increasing order of activity importance: The respective means for the
first, second, and third most important activities were 2.78, 3.55, and
3.77. Given that tests of Hypotheses 1 through 3 were considered more
central to the current research relative to tests of Hypotheses 4 and 5
(and given that order did not affect the results of Study 1), we assessed
one's own willingness to sacrifice prior to beliefs regarding partner's
willingness to sacrifice.
Results and Discussion
To test Hypotheses 1, 2t and 3, we performed both correla-
tional and regression analyses, the results of which are summa-
rized in Table 2. The latter analysis regressed willingness to
sacrifice onto the main effects of commitment level and social
value orientation (i.e., prosocials vs. individualists) and the in-
teraction of commitment level with social value orientation. This
analysis revealed a significant association between commitment
level and sacrifice, /(51) = 2.04, p < .05, paralleling the result
that greater commitment is significantly correlated with en-
hanced levels of sacrifice (see column labeled Correlation with
sacrifice in Table 2); this finding supports Hypothesis 1. Second,
relevant to Hypothesis 2, the analysis revealed a significant inter-
action of commitment level and social value orientation, t(5l)
= 2.17, p < .05. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Table 2 reveals
a significantly stronger association between commitment and
sacrifice among individualists than among prosocials (indeed,
the association between commitment and sacrifice was nonsig-
nificant among prosocials)."
Recall that the participants in this study were couples, rather
than independent participants. Accordingly, the data for partners
are not statistically independent. Therefore, we explored the
8
 These correlational and regression analyses were complemented by
an ANOVA using median splits to discriminate between high versus low
commitment. This analysis provided equally strong or stronger evidence
for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
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links between commitment and sacrifice separately for women
and men. Among women, the link between commitment and
sacrifice was greater among individualists, r( 11) = .46, than
among prosocials, r( 19) = - .06. Similarly, although somewhat
less pronounced, among men this link was somewhat greater
among individualists, r(lO) = .25, than among prosocials,
r(l5) — .06. Although low sample size does not allow for
stringent tests of significance, the overall pattern is congruent
with Hypothesis 2.
Relevant to Hypothesis 3, a significant, positive correlation
between social value orientation and willingness to sacrifice
revealed that prosocials exhibited lower, rather than higher, lev-
els of willingness to sacrifice (i.e., prosocials were coded as
0 and individualists as 1). Indeed, contrary to Hypothesis 3,
examination of the means revealed that individualists (Af =
3.33, SD = 1.77) exhibited a greater willingness to sacrifice
than did prosocials (M = 2.45, SD - 1.44). This main effect for
social value orientation was marginal in the regression analysis,
/(51) = 1.72, p < AO.9
To test Hypothesis 4, we assessed both perceived reciprocity
and actual reciprocity. Relevant to perceived reciprocity, we ob-
served a significant association between one's own willingness
to sacrifice and beliefs regarding partner's willingness to sacri-
fice. Using randomization procedures (i.e., random assignment
of partners within a couple to Partner 1 and Partner 2), this
correlation was significant for both Partner 1, r(37) - .81, p
<.001 , and Partner 2Tr(37) = .73, p< .001. Relevant to actual
reciprocity, we observed a significant association between one's
own willingness to sacrifice and actual partner's willingness to
sacrifice, r(37) = .41, p = .01. And in support of the validity
of our measure of willingness to sacrifice, we observed a sig-
nificant association between individual's own willingness to sac-
rifice and partner's beliefs regarding the individual's willingness
to sacrifice: for Partner 1, r(37) = .33, p < .05; for Partner 2,
r(37) = .53, p < .001.
Given low sample size (34 prosocials, 21 individualists) and
the fact that couples consisted of partners having identical or
different social value orientations, the statistical power of tests
concerning Hypothesis 5 is exceedingly small. Hence, it is not
surprising that our analysis did not reveal significant moderation
by social value orientation. However, given that most findings
are in the predicted direction, Hypothesis 5 should be tested in
future research using a larger sample size.10
Finally, this research explored the association between Time
1 commitment and breakup at Time 2 and Time 3 (i.e., 18
months after Time 1, we telephoned participants to collect infor-
mation regarding breakup). By Time 2, 10 relationships had
ended, 56 relationships persisted, and we were unable to obtain
this information for 20 relationships; by Time 3, 15 relationships
had ended, 40 relationships persisted, and we were unable to
obtain this information for 31 relationships. The link between
commitment and breakup at Time 2 and Time 3 was assessed
by examining (a) individuals' levels of commitment and (b)
the average level of commitment across both partners. At Time
2, results revealed that levels of commitment were somewhat
higher among partners in relationships that persisted (A/ — 6.60,
SD = 1.06) than among partners in relationships that ended (M
= 6.11, SD ~ 1.53), although not significantly so: For individu-
als, F(l, 130) = 3.20, p < .10; for couples, F( 1,64) = 2.12,
p - .15. However, at Time 3, we observed that levels of commit-
ment were higher among partners in relationships that persisted
(M = 6.87, SD = .82) than among partners in relationships that
ended (M = 6.26, SD = 1.21); for individuals, F(U 108) =
9.11,/? < .01; for couples, F ( l , 53) = 6.56, p < .05. (Unfortu-
nately, we could not reliably assess the association between
Time 2 willingness to sacrifice and breakup because only five
relationships ended between Time 2 and Time 3.) Thus, given
that Time 1 and Time 3 were separated by 1 V2 years, the current
research complements prior research on commitment (i.e., Rus-
bult, 1983; Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997) by providing evi-
dence in support of the role of commitment in understanding
relationship maintenance over a fairly substantial period of time.
General Discussion
The primary goal of the present research was to examine
both the link between dependence-relevant features of relation-
ships and willingness to sacrifice and whether preexisting indi-
vidual differences in social value orientations might moderate
this link. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both studies revealed a
significant link between commitment and willingness to sacri-
fice. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the link between commit-
ment and sacrifice was more pronounced among individualists
than among prosocials; moreover, Study 1 revealed that this
link was somewhat more pronounced among individualists than
among competitors. Both studies failed to find support for Hy-
pothesis 3, the prediction that prosocials would exhibit greater
willingness to sacrifice than would individualists or competitors
(although Study 1 revealed greater levels of sacrifice among
prosocials than among competitors).
Before considering these findings in greater detail, we wish
9
 We have further explored the meaning of the main effect for social
value orientation. A 2 (social value orientation) X 2 (gender) ANOVA
revealed an interaction of social value orientation and gender, F( 1, 51)
= 9.91, p < .01, demonstrating that prosocial men (M - 2.74, SD =
1.60) tended to exhibit at least as much willingness to sacrifice as did
individualistic women (M = 2.42, SD = 1.48); however, prosocial
women (M = 2.09, SD = 1.17} exhibited lower willingness to sacrifice
than did individualistic women (M = 4.33, SD = 1.54). Thus, it would
seem that among women, individualists may exhibit greater levels of
sacrifice than prosocials.
1C
 The correlation between one's own willingness to sacrifice and
perceived partner sacrifice was somewhat more pronounced among pro-
socials, r(34) - .73,p < .001, than among individualists, r(2l) = .59,
p < .001, although not significantly so, z = .85, ns. Also, a 2 (social
value orientation) X 2 (target of sacrifice: self vs. partner) ANOVA
revealed no interaction of social value orientation and target of sacrifice,
F(l, 53) = .06, ns. As in Study 1, a marginal main effect for target,
F<1,53) =3.62.p~ .06, revealed that participants believed that partner
willingness to sacrifice (M = 3.12, SD = 1.60) was somewhat greater
than their own willingness to sacrifice {M = 2.79, SD = 1.62). Parallel-
ing an earlier result, the analysis revealed a main effect for social value
orientation, F(l, 53) = 5.50, p < .05, indicating that willingness to
sacrifice for both self and partner was greater among individualists (A/
= 3.52, SD = 1.49) than among prosocials {M = 2.60, SD = 1.38).
Finally, focusing on actual reciprocity, we observed the average correla-
tion between both partner's willingness to sacrifice to be somewhat
greater among prosocials, r(34) = .35, than among individualists, r(21)
= .19, but not significantly so.
SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION 1341
to outline two broad interrelated implications of the current
research. Relevant to interdependence theory, the present find-
ings provide evidence in support of the claim that social value
orientations reflect transformational tendencies that affect re-
sponsiveness to dependence-relevant features of relationships.
Such differences indicate the necessity of simultaneously evalu-
ating the different embodiments of transformation of motivation
(i.e., dispositions, dependence-relevant features of relation-
ships), thereby contributing to our understanding of the specific
motivations that may underlie willingness to sacrifice in close
relationships. A related implication of the current findings fol-
lows from prior research revealing somewhat weak (and occa-
sionally inconsistent) links between dispositional variables and
prosocial behavior in the real world (e.g., Batson, Bolen,
Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Eisenberg, 1986; Krebs,
1970; however, see McClintock & Allison, 1989). Researchers
have addressed these weak effects, advancing person by situa-
tion approaches or multiplicative models of dispositional vari-
ables (e.g., Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Kenrick & Funder,
1988; Knight, Johnson, Carlo, & Eisenberg, 1994; Staub, 1978).
The current findings are consistent with these latter approaches,
in that in accounting for willingness to sacrifice, the impact of
social value orientations was modest (i.e., Study 1 revealed
weak support for Hypothesis 3), absent, or even contrary to our
expectations (Study 2) . In contrast, interactions of social value
orientation with commitment level were consistently observed.
Thus, it seems useful to consider the interactions of dispositional
orientations and tendencies following from relationship-specific
features in addition to additive models focusing on either dispo-
sitional orientations or relationship-specific orientations.
The theoretical importance of the current research, at least
in part, derives from the fact that Disposition X Features-of-
Relationships interactions help to understand why features of
relationships may promote willingness to sacrifice (cf. Snyder &
Ickes, 1985). The current research focused on a well-docu-
mented model of relationship functioning, the investment model,
that centers on dependence-relevant features of relationships
(e.g., Rusbult, 1983; Rusbult et al., 1991). Consistent with
the investment model (i.e., Hypotheses 1, l a - l c ) , our findings
revealed that high levels of commitment (and high levels of
satisfaction, low levels of perceived alternatives, and large in-
vestment size) were associated with greater willingness to sacri-
fice. The current findings complement prior research by Van
Lange, Rusbult, et al. (1997) by demonstrating a link between
commitment and willingness to sacrifice assessed 9 months later,
thereby indicating that this link is not an artifact stemming from
response tendencies (e.g., self-presentation) or temporary states
(e.g., day-to-day differences in mood). Moreover, it is interest-
ing to note that the present interdependence orientation, at least
in part, identifies the origins of prosocial motivation in the fea-
tures of interdependence characterizing a relationship, assuming
that important sources of prosocial motivation may be relation-
ship-specific. As such, the current orientation, and our support
for the link between commitment and willingness to sacrifice,
extend and complement alternative conceptualizations of proso-
cial motivation, which have tended to emphasize dispositional
or normative origins of prosocial motivation (cf. Eisenberg &
Fabes, 1991; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Staub, 1978).
At the same time, commitment (as well as satisfaction, alter-
natives, and investments) does not tell the whole story in under-
standing willingness to sacrifice in ongoing relationships. Al-
though each of these investment model variables generally was
associated with willingness to sacrifice, most of these links were
more pronounced among individualists than among prosocials
and, to some extent, competitors. Such interactions indicate that
the links between these dependence-relevant features of relation-
ships and willingness to sacrifice can be understood, at least in
part, in terms of concern with long-term personal welt-being,
rather than an intrinsic concern with partner well-being or a
concern deriving from competition. The results of Study 1 re-
vealed that the links between investment model variables and
willingness to sacrifice continued to be significant for prosocials
(and, to some extent, for competitors as well), suggesting that
these individuals are not alien to the pursuit of long-term per-
sonal well-being (i.e., they, too, tend to assign positive value to
outcomes for self). But, because a concern with good outcomes
for self can be seen as just one of the goals pursued by prosocials
and competitors, these individuals should indeed be less respon-
sive to dependence-relevant features of relationships than indi-
vidualists, for whom the pursuit of personal well-being, immedi-
ate or distant, is the primary or exclusive goal. Alternatively, it
is plausible that the link between commitment and sacrifice
should not be explained merely in terms of concern with long-
term self-interest. Indeed, it is likely that commitment to some
degree is associated with feelings of psychological attachment
in such a manner that it promotes concern with partner's well-
being as well as one's own well-being. Thus, the significant
albeit modest links between commitment and sacrifice among
prosocials may also be attributed to some propartner concerns.
The current research contributes to prior research on social
value orientation. Although there is increasing evidence in sup-
port of the ecological validity of social value orientation, it is
important to note that the vast majority of studies on social
value orientation have focused on behavior in experimental
games. Also, to our knowledge not one of these studies has
examined the role of social value orientations in the context of
existing relationships in which partners share a history and a
future of interdependence. However, as noted earlier, contrary
to Hypothesis 3, prosocials did not exhibit greater willingness
to sacrifice than individualists. In retrospect, this may not be
surprising. The current research examined ongoing close rela-
tionships, which presumably are characterized by relatively high
levels of dependence and long-term orientation. Hence, it is
understandable that individualists, like prosocials, tend to exhibit
fairly high levels of sacrifice.
A second goal of the present research was to examine the
link between one's own willingness to sacrifice and (beliefs
regarding) partner's willingness to sacrifice. In support of Hy-
pothesis 4, results revealed (a) a strong association between
one's own willingness to sacrifice and beliefs regarding the
partner's willingness to sacrifice (Studies 1 and 2), and (b) a
significant, albeit somewhat weaker association between one's
own willingness to sacrifice and actual partner's willingness
to sacrifice (Study 2) . How do we account for these effects?
Consistent with interdependence theory, and theories relevant to
interdependence, we believe that these findings, at least in part,
are accounted for by the desire for reciprocity. Two findings, in
particular, are congruent with this assumption. First, the link
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between one's own willingness to sacrifice and beliefs regarding
partner's willingness to sacrifice was somewhat more pro-
nounced among prosocials than among individualists (Study 1),
a finding that is consistent with prior research on experimental
games (cf. Hypothesis 5).11 Second, Study 2 revealed a signifi-
cant association between partners' actual willingness to sacri-
fice. However, given that the link between one's own willingness
to sacrifice and beliefs regarding partner's willingness to sacri-
fice was somewhat more pronounced than the link between the
partners' willingness to sacrifice, it is likely that mechanisms
other than reciprocity underlie the former link (e.g., tendencies
toward assumed or real similarity, post hoc self-justification,
and modeling; however, the absence of a significant association
between one's own and partner's social value orientation is not
consistent with the real similarity explanation).
We should also briefly comment on the general finding that
individuals ascribed somewhat greater levels of sacrifice to their
partners than to themselves. Although this finding is not incon-
sistent with our predictions (i.e., this pattern was anticipated for
individualists and competitors), it may also be that individuals to
some extent constructed overly positive (and perhaps illusory)
images of their partners. Indeed, it is logically impossible that
all of our partners are more self-sacrificial than we are ourselves
(for related reasoning regarding positive illusion, see Taylor &
Brown, 1988). Consistent with this view, recent research has
revealed that for global attributes, individuals tend to view their
partners very favorably, even more positively than they view
themselves (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). The tendency
to attribute prosocial intentions and motivations to the partner
reflects trust and may be functional because it helps individuals
feel more secure or confident about their partners and relation-
ships (cf. Holmes & Murray, 1996).l2
Before closing, we should note that the current findings need
to be considered in light of the following limitations. Although
Study 2 assessed commitment a substantial period prior to will-
ingness to sacrifice, the current research did not directly assess
the direction of causality underlying the link between commit-
ment and willingness to sacrifice; also, both studies did not
address in any way the causal direction underlying the link
between one's own willingness to sacrifice and partner's will-
ingness to sacrifice. Although this research assumes that the
subjective experience of dependence is an important determinant
of willingness to sacrifice, it is also possible that willingness
to sacrifice might promote greater feelings of dependence or
commitment. For example, acts of sacrifice may later be experi-
enced as investments that, over time, sustain or strengthen com-
mitment. In this regard, it may be appropriate to regard the
causal relationship between commitment and sacrifice as bidi-
rectional. Similarly, the link between one's own willingness to
sacrifice and partner's willingness to sacrifice may be largely
bidirectional, in that these variables may feed back on each
other over time and unfold in concert over the course of a
relationship (cf. Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997).
From these perspectives, we cannot rule out alternative expla-
nations for the current findings. One such interpretation is based
on the notion that individualists may be more likely than proso-
cials to construe self-sacrificial acts as costly, and therefore
experience greater discomfort (because such acts conflict with
immediate self-interest, whereas the long-term outcomes for self
to some extent are uncertain). Such uneasiness may be resolved
by a process of self-justification, by coloring their perceptions
of dependence-relevant features of relationships as well as their
perceptions of partner willingness to sacrifice (e.g., "I engaged
in self-sacrificial, costly activities, but my partner is likely to
sacrifice even more"; cf. Messe & Sivacek, 1979). Competitors
should be less likely to engage in such self-justification pro-
cesses because they exhibit relatively low levels of willingness
to sacrifice and hence may experience less discomfort.
Second, this research used two distinct samples (i.e., Study
1 was conducted in the United States and in the Netherlands),
yet focused on one self-report measure that assessed willingness
to sacrifice rather than actual self-sacrificial behaviors. One
important reason is that the current measurement of willingness
to sacrifice (which is inspired by forced-choice methodology)
has been demonstrated to have good validity; it exhibits good
test-retest reliability, tends to be independent of tendencies to-
ward favorable self-presentation, is correlated with a behavioral
measure of sacrifice, and is predictive of whether relationships
persist versus end (Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997). Moreover,
Study 2 provided some evidence for the validity of our measure-
ment, in that self-reported willingness to sacrifice is correlated
with the partner's description of the individual's willingness to
sacrifice. Thus, there is good reason to believe that the current
measure of willingness to sacrifice may be quite predictive of
actual sacrifice (even though actual willingness to sacrifice
should consist of willingness to sacrifice and the frequency or
intensity with which the relationship calls for sacrifice).
Third, this work focused on individuals who were involved
in dating relationships (rather than those in longer term marital
relationships). It is plausible that commitment may be some-
what higher among more mature relationships and that the
sources for commitment are somewhat different (e.g., commit-
ment among mature relationships may be more strongly based
11
 Study 3 failed to find a significantly stronger link between own and
partner willingness to sacrifice for prosocials relative to competitors. In
light of prior research, it may well be that competitors' concern with
maximizing relative advantage over others is primarily defensive, ensur-
ing that their own input does not exceed the benefits they might receive
in return, a goal that to some extent is consistent with reciprocity and
therefore helps one to understand their fairly high responsiveness to
beliefs regarding partner willingness to sacrifice (cf. aversive competi-
tion; Kuhlman et al., 1986; Messick & Thorngate, 1967).
12
 In contrast, earlier work of Ross and Sicoly (1979) has revealed
that individuals tend to overestimate their own, rather than their partner's
specific contributions to their joint well-being (e.g., taking out the gar-
bage). It seems plausihle that judgments of specific contributions are
mediated by differential cognitive availability of one's own and partner's
activities, whereas judgments of global attributes, particularly those re-
garding the partner, may be colored by the desire to attribute favorable
intentions to the partner. It is also interesting to link the present findings
to a large body of research revealing that individuals tend to think of
themselves as more prosocial, generous, and fair than the average other
(e.g., Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Van Lange, 1991),
findings that frequently are explained in terms of motivation to maintain
or improve a favorable self-image. However, in the context of an ongoing
close relationship, one could argue that it is also self-serving to believe
that a partner is strongly motivated to sacrifice; after all, this would
imply that "I am a person worthy of sacrifice,"' which may be an indirect
way to maintain or improve a favorable understanding of self.
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on investment size). Thus, it would be important to examine
whether commitment promotes willingness to sacrifice among
partners in long-term relationships and whether social value
orientation moderates this link.
Conclusion
The current work examined associations among interpersonal
orientations, prosocial behavior, and close relationships, thereby
integrating literatures that frequently are treated as separate lines
of research. For example, there tend to be few cross references
in these literatures, review articles do not tend to integrate the
insights obtained in these lines of research, and textbooks tend
to devote separate chapters to these topics. We contend that
these lines of research are conceptually interrelated (e.g., most
deal with issues of interdependence) and that frequently, similar
motivations (e.g., concern with partner well-being, long-term
self-interest, and reciprocity) are relevant to increasing our
knowledge regarding interpersonal orientations, prosocial be-
havior, and relationship functioning. Although preliminary, the
current findings underscore the fruitfulness of such an integra-
tive approach, in that a dispositional variable arising from re-
search on experimental games—social value orientation—in
combination with dependence-relevant features of relationships
is relevant to understanding the motives underlying willingness
to sacrifice in ongoing close relationships.
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